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DOWEI IN JUDICIAL ACTIONS
DOWER IN JUDICIAL ACTIONS.
CLARENCE E. MARTIN
A support or maintenance of the wife, known to our law as
dower, is not a new legal institution. Provision for the wife was
practiced in the Roman law long before the birth of Christ.
The Roman dos, or marriage portion, was provided by the wife's
father or some of the wife's relations. If the wife continued a
member of her father's clan or family, the husband being then
under no obligation to maintain her, she needed no dos. But, if
and when she left the parental roof, a dos was necessary. The
theory of the Roman law, therefore, was that the dos was given
as a provision for the expenses of the marriage-hence has grown
the custom of dowry in all Latin countries. The radical differ-
ence-and it is radical-between dowry or dos and dower, is that,
at the Roman Law, the former was brought into the family by the
wife, and, at the common law, the latter comes from the husband's
estate. The words, however, in the centuries of use, seem to have
become more or less synonymous.
By the lex Julia, (B. C. 90), the father was compelled, if he
had the means, to provide his daughter's dos, which passed into
the control of the husband. It could not be disposed of, or en-
cumbered, however, and the wife had the right to see that the dos
was applied according to its legitimate purpose. Unless determined
upon at its creation, upon dissolution of the marriage, the dos
reverted to the donor or his heirs.
The Emperor Justinian, in the Institutes, refers to the donatione
ante nuptias, which, he writes, by the constitutions of his father,
Justin, might be increased after marriage. He says that by the lex
Julia, the husband was prohibited from alienating Italian immov-
ables, which formed part of the dowry, against the wish of the
wife, but lest the weakness of the female sex should be abused to
the detriment of their fortunes, he extends the law to all the
Roman dominions. This great lawgiver also promulgated the rule
that when the dos was returned by the husband, to the wife, at
0 President of The West Virginia Bar Association, Martinsburg, W. Va. Bar.
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his death, in the form of a legacy, the legacy had to be paid with-
out delay and no set-off of any character was admissible.
Dower, as we know it at the common law, however, did not exist
at the Roman law. The civil law, in its original state, says Black-
stone, had nothing that bore a resemblance to dower at the com-
mon law. Modern law writers tell us that dower is one of the most
ancient institutions of the English common law. Lord Bacon re-
marks that in his time the law favored three things-life, liberty
and dower.
The Anglo-Saxons were hardly removed from the pagan in-
stincts of centuries, when the dooms of King Fthelbert were writ-
ten at the end of the sixth, or the beginning of the seventh century,
in the days of St. Augustine. In the seventy-fifth section, he
proclaims:
"For the 'mund' of a widow of the best class, of an earl's
degree, let the 'bot' be L shillings; of the second, XX shillings;
of the third, XII shillings; and of the fourth, VI shillings"
The 'mund,' as described in the Longobardic law, was the sum
paid to the family of the bride, for transferring the tutelage they
possessed over her to the family of the husband. It is apparent,
therefore, that the widow was provided for out of the estate of
her husband by being paid a certain definite amount, even though
the 'mund' had been paid to her family at the time of marriage.1
Doubting that the institution was introduced by the Norman,
because it bears not the slightest trace to any feudal reason for
its invention, Blackstone 2 says that it is possible that it might be
with us the relic of a Danish custom; since, according to the his-
torians of that country, dower was introduced into Denmark by
Swein, the father of Canute the Great, out of gratitude to the
Danish ladies, who sold all their jewels to ransom him when taken
prisoner by the vandals. "However, this bee," says he "the reason
which our law gives for adopting it, is a very plain and sensible
one; for the sustenance of the wife, and the nurture and education
of the younger children."
In Doomesday dos is called maritagium, says Lord Coke, in his
Commentaries on Littleton,3 but as we shall presently see maritag-
ium was in reality curtesy as we now know it. The very word,
says Coke, "doth impart a freedome." Among them, he recites,
is that the tenant in dower shall not be "destroyned for the debt
I Sources of Ancient and Punitive Law. I Evolution of Law Series, 518.
* Vol. 2, 129.
* Lib. 1, c. 5, § 36.
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due to the King by the husband in his life time in the lands which
she held in dower." Glanville, who wrote in the latter part of the
twelfth century, distinguishes between the Roman dos and our
dower, which latter, he says, corresponds with maritagium or
marriagehood. But, marriagehood, as described by Glanville in
the, same book4 is equivalent to the Roman dos and in reality is our
curtesy, for it was land given with the woman in marriage, which
Glanville says reverted, unless the donee had "by her an Heir,
Male or Female, heard to cry within the four walls," in which
event the estate remained to the third generation and then re-
verted. Glanville devotes his entire sixth book to the law of
dower and there describes the two kinds of dower then known-
dower at the church door or ad ostium ecclesiae and by force of
law. He gives forms of procedure and writs for its recovery or
assignment. Forty days were given to the heir for assignnient,
during which time the widow enjoyed her quarantine. Now the
widow, under our statute,' enjoys her quarantine until dower is
assigned.
Bracton discusses it; it is referred to in Fleta. Britton, which
was written in the latter part of the twelfth century, adds to
Glanville's two kinds of dower, a third, known as ex assenu patrhis,
or by consent of the groom's father. Dower, at that time, was
forfeited by a second marriage or adultery or elopement, even
though the latter two happenings were not causes for divorce a
vinculo. It was extinguished by treason or felony of the husband,
because forfeiture took place and the wife was presumed to have
advised or aided the husband to break the law. And, too, at that
time dower had become subject to crown debts or taxes, Lord Coke
to the contrary notwithstanding. Writing of the writ for reason-
able dower, Britton says6 that "it is intended that this action shall
be the most favored of any of the writs of possession not pleadable
by assize, and therefore there ought to be greater dispatch there-
in."2
In the Mirror of Justices,7 dower is referred to as an ordinance
existing, apparently, whereof the memory of man runneth not to
the contrary. In summing up what had previously been the law,
it is stated that every one "might endow his wife ad ostium ec-
clesiae," without the consent of his heirs, and that widows marry-
ing again without the consent of the guardians of their lands,
4 7, c. 18.G C. 65. § 8, W. Va. Code.
8 II, 249b.
written by Horn about 1290.
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"should lose their doweries." Bigamy and adultery are given as
causes of forfeiture.
No reference is made to dower in Magna Charta. Yet in the
Great Charter of 1217, it is provided that there shall be assigned
to the widow as dower the third part of all the land, which "was
his (not at the time of the marriage, but) in his life time, unless
she was endowed of less at the church door." This latter was in-
terpreted to mean unless she had accepted less at the church door.
"Bracton's text and the decision of Bracton's time, however, sug-
gest that this phrase in the charter was loosely used and without
any intention of changing the law laid down by Glanville." 8 The
second Statute of Westminister contains a chapter on dower and its
incidents. The Year Books of Edward I, it is said, contain many
cases in reference to dower and its assignment.
It was not until Littleton wrote in the latter part of the fifteenth
century that the law of dower and curtesy was becoming settled.
Probably the greatest change from the law laid down by Glanville
and the earlier law writers, was the limitation of dower to estates
held during coverture and making dower at least a one-third inter-
est for life in all such lands, whether the dower at the church door
was less or not.
Whatever may be the changes in our law from century to cen-
tury, it is apparent that dower owes it§ origin and existence to the
introduction of Christianity into England, where, as elsewhere, the
status of the woman was raised from that of a serf to that of a
human being. In Ethelbert's law, we find the first trace after his
conversion and baptism by Augustine, and from thence down the
ages, the woman was entitled to some part of her husband's estate
for her support and maintenance. It certainly took the place of
the old pagan practice of buying the bride from her father or
family. This was abhorrent to Christian ideals and brought forth
the substitute or first form known as dower ad ostium ecclesiae
which was, as its name implies, made at the very door of the
church by the bridegroom of full age, owner in fee simple, at the
time of the marriage, and after "affiance made and troth plighted."
The endowment might be of the whole or any part of the lands,
the interest differing in different portions of the country. There
is therefore an historical significance to the present day words of
the marriage ceremony "with all my worldly goods, I thee endow."
Dower could be given only openly and at the church door. Secret
8 2 POLLOCK AND MAmLAND 421.
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [1924], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol30/iss4/3
DOWER IN JUDICIAL ACTIONS
or death bed marriages carried no endowment of dower-the de-
claration must be made publicly.
And so with dower ex assenu patris. When a young man had
no lands of his own and desiring to copy the custom of more
fortunate youths, with the consent of his father who must have
been present, he would at the church door and at the time of the
marriage, endow his bride with dower in the lands he hoped some
day would be his. This dower attached, even though he did not
survive to take as heir to the father. It was therefore a vested
estate and not an inchoate right.
Blackstone mentions these two forms and the dower at the com-
mon law, as well as dower by custom, which was confined only to
such places where the custom was different from either the com-
mon law or other forms. The two forms of dower created at the
church door were abolished by third and fourth William IV, chap.
105. Littleton mentions a fifth form or dower de la plus belle,
which Blackstone says was abolished with the military tenures
of which it was a consequence, because it was feudal in its nature.
Dower at the common law, as we have observed, grew out of the
desire of the law to provide for widows not endowed, or endowed
of less than a third at the church door, or in lands of which the
man was not seised at the time of marriage. Our forefathers
brought the common law form with them to this country and we
have this form, except where it has been changed by statute.
The development of dower in Virginia is interesting. The first
mention of dower is in the orders of the assembly during the ses-
sion of March, 1654, when the widow Burbage was given one-7alf
of the plantation at Nansemund and one-third of all the other lands
for life.0 In the regime of Sir Win. Berkeley, in September, 1664,
an act was passed by the General Assembly, in which it is recited
that some doubts have arisen as to the manner of assigning dower,
and enacting that thereafter land and houseing shall be divided,
according to quantity and quality, equally into thirds, and the
widow shall take her choice.10 In 1673, it was enacted that the
widow should be endowed with a third of the real estate for life,
giving the husband power to devise more to his wife, "but not
lesse." 11 The widow needed no vote in Virginia to assert herself.
Dower was becoming troublesome. In 1705, the General Assembly
enacted that if a widow sent a dower slave out of the colony, or if
2 1 Hening Stat. 405.
' 2 Hening Stat. 212.
II 2 Henlng Stat. 303.
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her second husband did it for her, she should forfeit dower in the
slaves and lands as well.12 And at the same session, it was enacted
that the widow, not having a jointure settled on her in the lifetime
of her husband, as by law "doth barr her of her dower," shall be
"endowed of one full and equal third part" of her deceased hus-
band's estate, "in manner as is directed and prescribed by the
laws and constitutions of the Kingdom of England," and that she
might occupy the mansion house and plantation thereto belonging,
rent free, till dower was assigned."3 A similar provision was con-
tained in the act of 1748, which, for another reason, was vetoed
by the King and ordered repealed.' 4
So colonial Virginia adopted finally the common law form of
dower, although its legislative expression was a mere gesture. The
common law form was always present. It is interesting to con-
jecture whether the other forms of dower found a resting place in
our early jurisprudence. The language of the statutes does not
preclude them. It is fair to presume therefore that the forms were
in effect, if not practiced, prior to the Revolution and that there
has been no direct repeal of them. But the statute which provides
that the common law shall be in force, except where changed by
statute, would seem to be an effectual bar to the advocacy of any
or either of the other forms, and leaves us the common law form
alone to consider in our discussion.
The inchoate right is neither a title, nor an estate in land, nor
a lien upon the husband's land, nor a personal claim against the
husband. It confers upon the wife no right of possession or control
of the land to which it attaches." It is not protected by the Con-
stitution until it becomes a consummate right or a vested estate, and
consequently, even after marriage and before the death of the hus-
band, the legislature may modify or destroy it at will without ex-
ceeding its constitutional limits. 6 Marriage not being technically
a contract, does not come within the protection of the constitutions,
relative to laws affecting prior contracts. It is more than a possi-
bility, however, it is a subsisting, separate and distinct interest or
right, possessing many of the incidents of property. The right
to dower is absolute during the life of the husband, if there be (1)
lawful marriage, (2) actual or constructive seizure of real estate
12 3 Hening Stat. 335.
2s 3 Henlng Stat. 374.
14 5 Hening Stat. 448, 568.
" 19 C. J. 493.
if- 1hornburg v. Thornburg, 1 W. Va. 522.
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during coverture, and, it is consummated upon (3) death of hus-
band. In West Virginia, the contingent dower right,
"is not property, and has no commercial value capable of ascer-
tainment. It is a mere contingency wisely ordained for the pro-
tection of the wife in case she is left a widow, an event which
may never happen, and until that contingency does arise the law
does not regard the inchoate right as property having transfer-
able quality or commercial value. The law makes provision for
its release or extinguishment, but none whereby it may pass to
another. "1 7
An inchoate right of dower is an incumbrance.'8 Unlike dower
at the common law, under our statute the inchoate right exists in
an equitable estate, or to a right of entry or action in any land, if
an estate of inheritance.1 9
It is barred by jointure 0 when intended to be in lieu of dower.
The word "intended" was inserted in 1849, instead of the words
"expressly or by avertment;" aifd the statute now covers personal,
as well as real property, as part of the jointure, if so intended.
Dower is also barred by leaving the husband and living in adultery
or leaving without a cause entitling at least to divorce a mensa,
and continuing thus at the time of his death.2 ' It is unnecessary
to say, I take it, that divorce a vinculo bars dower,, because the
theory of the law is that such divorce dates back to the time of the
marriage, and to all intents and purposes, save legitimacy of chil-
dren, in effect holds that there never was a marriage existing be-
tween the parties. A man may not deprive his wife of dower by
will. Within one year of probate, she may renounce the will and
take her dower.2 - It does not exist where the husband had a right
to the reversion, which had not vested nor to which right of entry
did not exist in his life time2 3 because seisin in law, which alone is
necessary, is absent.
And while it is true, that property is not primarily or solely the
object of marriage, and is but an incident which may or may not
attach, yet our Virginia courts have gone far to hold that where the
husband has a limited estate, if it be an estate of inheritance,
that issue might by possibility inherit, and there is actual con-
structive seisin during coverture, the widow is entitled to dower.
17 Williams, J., in Carver v. Ward, 81 W. Va. 644, 95 S. E. 828.
3s Stone V. Kaufman, 88 W. Va. 588, 107 S. E. 295.
19 W. Va. Code, c. 65, § 2; c. 71, § 17.
= W. Va. Code, c. 65, § 4.
= W. Va. Code, c. 65, § 7.
2 W. Va. Code, c. 78, § 11.
= Blow v. Maynard, 2 Leigh 29.
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As an illustration our court has held that where property is de-
vised "to A and if he die without issue, to B", A's widow is dow-
able.2 4
"Dower is the widow's last plank in her shipwreck." 25  And
while it is that last plank and she takes one-third of the rents from
the moment of vesting,28 yet it must be in good faith, and she may
not take title in her name to her husband's real estate in fraud of
his creditors, for the husband then has no seisin, actual or con-
structive, and there can be no dower.
27
We have observed that only two things are necessary to create
the inchoate right, to-wit: lawful marriage and seisure during cov-
erture. How can the wife divest herself or be be divested of the in-
choate right? The assignment of dower, the ascertainment of its
value for a sum gross in lieu thereof under the statute, the convey-
ance or joinder in the deed for that purpose during the life of the
husband and after the right has become a vested estate, the defeat
by jointure or action of the wife, the effect of divorce or the ex-
istence of the will, are every day problems in the lawyer's office.
Joining with her husband in the execution of a deed conveying
land, the wife simply releases her inchoate right, and she is estop-
ped from thereafter asserting that right. She does not convey
anything.28  Where land is sold in the lifetime of the husband to
satisfy a lien, created prior to marriage, or afterwards where she
has joined, or for the purchase money, whether she has joined or
not, or otherwise paramount to her claim, she has no inchoate
right.29  This statute was part of the report of the revisors of the
code in 1849, the recommendation of whom was substantially
adopted by the legislature. The Virginia Court has held 0 that
where a married woman joined in a deed of trust to secure a debt
she released her inchoate right of dower in the land and was barred
of any interest therein. In two cases31 the Virginia court held that
where there was a sale and surplus after payment of debt, the wife
is barred of any lien upon or interest in the land, but must look to
the surplus alone, and the purchaser takes the title to the real es-
tate free and clear of any claim to inchoate dower. This would
2 Couch v. Eastham, 69 w. Va. 710, 73 S. E. 314, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 307.
Brown, J, in Engle v. Engle, 2 W. Va. 246, 257.
Engle v. Engle, supra note 25.
Grant v. Sutton, 2 Va. Dec. 249.
28 Carver v. Ward, supra note 17.
2 W. Va. Code, c. 65, § 3.
ao Gilliam -v. Moore, 4 Leigh 30; Wheatley Heirs v,. Calhoun, 12 Leigh 264;
wilsoa v. Davison, 2 Robinson 384; Robinson o. Shacklett, 29 Gratt. 99; Summers v.
Dame, 31 Gratt. 791; Coffman v. Coffman, 79 Va. 504; Hurst v. Dulaney, 87 Va.
444, 12 S. E. 800.
31 Robinson v. Shacklett, supra; Hurst t?. Dulaney, supra note 30.
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seem to be a common sense rule. It is certainly a common sense in-
terpretation of the statute. Joining in the execution of a deed or
a deed of trust is one of the ways by which a wife releases her in-
choate right.
But our court, on the indentical statute, says that while the
woman does not have a right to dower in the land, for she has
released that, yet if there is a surplus, and the woman survives her
husband, she is entitled to dower in the surplus and such dower
in the surplus is a lien upon the very real estate which she has by
her solemn deed released from her inchoate right of dower.32
Reading into the statute the word "lien," which does not occur,
and attempting to overcome the clear import and meaning of that
statute, Judge Haymond, speaking for an unanimous court, lays
stress upon the case of Wilson v. Davisson,33 and says that the
legislature, by adding a clause to the statute recommended by the
revisers of the Code of 1849, made the dissenting opinion in that
case the law of Virginia. It is admitted in the opinion that the
purchaser takes the land free from dower, but subject to the in-
choate right of the wife to dower in the surplus, if any, and that
when such inchoate right becomes consummate, then such right to
dower in the surplus, is a lien upon the land even though it be in
the hands of an innocent purchaser. Should it be a sale under a
deed of trust and the trustee makes no settlement, or should it be
a judicial sale and the papers are lost, or should it be impossible
to determine what the surplus is, if any, how can you pass upon the
title with any degree of certainty? Mark you, under that decision
the lien follows the land and the widow may look for her dower
in the surplus, even though by her solemn deed, one of statutory
methods of release, she has released the very lands of her inchoate
right, then in the hands of a bona fide purchaser, or someone who
claims under him. In other words, our court says that she has a
lien for her dower in the surplus upon the land which she has
released, and the husband or the creditors no doubt have taken
that surplus and applied it to other uses.
Again our court speaks,3 4 and, upon the same statute, holds that
it is error to sell the real estate in which there is a surplus, except
subject to the widow's dower. But how can it be determined prior
to the sale, that there will be a surplus? Like the former holding,
the effect is to sell the contingent right so far as the lien debt is
82 Holden v. Boggess, 20 W. Va. 62.
3 2 ROBINSON 384.
" Barbour v. Tompkins, 31 W. Va. 410, 7 S. E. 1.
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concerned, and the balance subject to the lien for computed dower,
which the wife has expressly released. Error once released runs
wild indeed! Luckily the statute says that the court may make
"such order as may seem to it proper to secure her right," that is
her dower in the surplus. Our court has also held that the wife,
prior to her husband's death, may not file a petition to protect her
inchoate right, and in another case,3" that the purchaser may not
do so. If, after sale with a surplus, neither wife nor purchaser
may move to protect their respective rights, is it not apparent that
the husband takes the surplus in which the wife has dower, and
the purchaser an interest?
The legislature intended certainly to settle the law. Our court
has attempted to legislate and make the law what it thinks it
should be. Assuredly the law in Berkeley County, is most un-
settled, upon an identical statute, the interpretation of which has
never caused the slightest tremor in Frederick County, and the
application of which might and does affect adjoining landowners!
Under the statute, dower is barred for any conduct for which
a decree for divorce a mensa would lie, providing the parties are
living separate and apart at the death of the husband, and the of-
fense is not forgiven.37 Property acquired after a decree a mensa,
by force of the statute is separate property and there is no dower
therein. 38  But dower or curtesy remain to that time. 9  A wife
may bar herself by her own agreement by taking lands in lieu
of dower, in a divorce action, even though that settlement is after-
wards set aside."0 Dower is released by ante-nuptial agreement,
only to the extent clearly manifested in the instrument by its plain
words or necessary implication therefrom.41 A joinder in a deed
to maintain and support husband and herself is a sufficient con-
sideration for post nuptial settlement to release dower.4 2 Bank-
ruptcy of the husband does not bar dower, nor is the wife estop-
ped, even though she appeared in the bankrupt action and orally
agreed to release her dower in consideration of a sum gross, if
after the sale no money was paid. But the court put the reason
for its conclusion upon the ground that there was no issue made as
m George v. Hess, 48 W. Va. 534, 37 S. E. 564.
31 Bassell v. Caywood, 54 W. Va. 241, 46 S. E. 159, 66 L. R. A. 880.
37 Thornburg v. Thornburg, 18 W. Va. 522.3S W. Va. Code. e. 64. § 12: Chapman v. Chapman, 70 W. Va. 522, 74 S. E. 661.
30 Hartigan v. Hartigan, 65 W. Va. 471, 64 S. E. 726, 131 A. L. R. 973; Kittle v.
Kittle, 86 W. Va. 46, 102 S. E. 799.
40 Fleming v. Pople, 78 W. Va. 176, 88 S. E. 1058.
41 Bramer . Bramer, 84 W. Va. 168, 99 S. E. 329.
t2 Deverlin v. Casto, 62 W. Va. .58, 57 S. E. 411.
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to dower, no appearance for that purpose, and no rule by which
any inchoate right could be measured.
43
Out of this maze of decisions, we come now, face to face, with
other decisions, which in this circuit at least again unsettles the
law. It has been our belief that when land was partitioned that
the wife's inchoate right followed the land assigned to her hus-
band. That proposition seems still to be safe. The seisure in
fact is to the land and when the interest of the tenant in common
is allotted, the right to curtesy or dower attaches to the allotted
portion. If the court can settle "all questions of law affecting the
legal title, that may arise in any proceedings," 44 and can direct
the sale if not susceptible of partition or divisible in kind, it must
naturally follow that the interest offered includes the inchoate
right of dower as though the interests were allotted and not sold.
But our court says that this isn't the law. It has held that the
inchoate right of husband or wife is not sold in a partition suit,
and that the inchoate right of the wife remains in the property after
sale, and, when consummate, action can be brought.4
We know that one of the material differences between dower
and curtesy is that dower attaches to all land held by the hus-
band during coverture, curtesy to land of the wife of which she
dies seized.4" The reason is that the wife may not convey without
her husband's joinder. Living separate, the wife may convey. In
Calvert v. Murphty, supra, the court held that a deed made by the
wife for her real estate in which the husband did not join, is void,
but it does create color of title, and adverse possession under it for
ten years ripens into title and she is disseised. And, therefore,
the husband, even if he be non compos mentis at the time the deed
is made, is barred of his curtesy, though he brought the suit within
the requisite statutory period after removal of disability, because
the statute having run against the wife in her lifetime, she had
no estate at her death.
In Helmick v. fraft, supra, it was held that the husband of a
female coparcenor is not a necessary party, unless he has some in-
terest other than the contingent right of curtesy. "Ordinarily,"
says Judge Poffenbarger, "a wife cannot convey her real estate
without the consent of her husband; but tie statute imposing or
retaining this restraint has no application to judicial sales, and
'3 Carver v. Ward, supra note 17.
" W. Va. Code, c. 79, § 1.
" Calvert v. Murphy, et al., 73 W. Va. 731, 81 S. E. 403, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.)
534; Hudkins v. Crim, 64 W. Va. 225, 61 S. E. 166; Helmick u. Kraft, 84 W. Va.
159, 99 S. E. 325; Ragland Coal Co. v. Spencer, 91 W. Va. 631, 114 S. E. 150.
" W. Va. Code, c. 65, § 15.
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the two statutes dealing with different subjects must be allowed
operation and effect accordant with their respective terms. '4
Therefore, it is apparent that the husband of the coparcenor is
barred of curtesy, because the court, by directing a sale in a ju-
dicial proceeding, can divest the married woman without consent
of her husband, and he need not even be a party to the suit and
has no right to come in and ask to be made one, and the wife not
being seized at the time of her death, with such estate, the husband
has no curtesy. It being separate property, the wife then takes
the proceeds, or the balance of the proceeds, of the sale of her
portion of the property free from any interferance of her husband.
Thus has legislature and court conspired to rob the common law
of one of its fundamentals-the right to and supervision over the
property of the wife.
Certainly, then, the rule will hold good as to the widow's dower.
But no; our court has determined4 8 that, under the law as it now
is, a widow's inchoate right of dower not becoming consummate
until death of the husband, when it attached to real estate held
at any time during the coverature, is not sold with the land by
the court in a partition suit, and a decree cannot authorize a sale
of the land free from the contingent right of dower. In other
words, such contingent right must remain unsold and in esse or in
vubibus, as you desire, to plague the purchaser, his grantee or
his heirs in the days to come. The court softens the force of its
decision by announcing that when reference is made to a commis-
sioner to ascertain the value, it may be done, and when ascertained,
the partitioners may agree to it and to a sale free from dower, and
the controversy may be amicably settled in that way. "Methods
of calculating the value of such contingent interests, though not
prescribed by statute, have been compiled by scientists and re-
sorted to by the courts in many cases for practical purposes," says
Judge Miller. How does this coincide with Judge Williams' ex-
pression in Carver v. Ward, supra, when he says: "There is no
means prescribed by law whereby the value of the wife's con-
tingent dower may be ascertained?"
In the Ragland Coal Co. Case, Judge Miller says that the par-
tition statute "makes no provisions for partition of such contingent
dower in law, nor does it make any provision for the sale thereof
and apportionment of the proceeds to such contingent interest."
I call your particular attention to the language of Judge Miller,
47 Helmick v. Kraft, supra note 45.
'1 Ragland Coal Co. v. Spencer, supra note 45.
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when he says that the statute makes no provision "for partition
of contingent dower in land." While dictum here, does this mean
that the court would decide in a proper case that allotment would
not carry the wife's dower to that share? The language is sus-
ceptible of such interpretation.
We have the Virginia statute of partition. The general assembly
of Virginia in 1886 added to section three of the statute the sen-
tence: "A sale of land so made by order of the court shall operate
to bar the contingent right of dower of the wife in the share of her
husband in the land so sold, whether she be a party to the suit or
not." This places the wife upon a parity with the husband. Her
dower is barred just as his curtesy. Judge Miller, in his opinion,
cites this statute, and then comments: "Under that statute land
sold in a partition suit would no doubt bar the wife's contingent
dower. But our statute does not so provide. The defendant in
this case has not by any instrument binding her consented to re-
lease or relinguish her contingent dower in the land decreed to
be sold. Apparently she stands on her legal rights. She cannot
be compelled to part with these legal rights in this suit, and she
can do so only by the method prescr'bed by statute, that is by her
votuntary deed." This decision is right, for under our statute
reasonably construed a wife may only bar her contingent right by
deed, as Judge Miller suggests, or in some way that would amount
to a deed.
Would an answer in a suit releasing dower estop future claim?
May a widow be estopped from asserting her consummate right by
her conduct when she had only an inchoate right? Or, to put it
another way, suppose a wife is a party to a suit, joins with her
husband in his answer, allows the property to be sold, may she,
upon the death of her husband, ask for dower in the land sold?
Or, may she in such suit, refuse to answer, remain silent, and be
barred by the judgment? Recent cases only are considered.
Having in mind the equitable statute and the statute giving one
under disability the right to sue after removal of such disability,
we may approach the inquiry with some degree of certainty that
a woman may not by her affirmative conduct, if not by her silence,
lead one into an unfair or inequitable position.
Reluctantly I have come to the conclusion that she is not estop-
ped. There is not a case in this state where the widow was barred
of her dower, or right to sue for its value under the statute, 9 or
49 W. Va. Code. c. 65.
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she was adjudged to have released it, unless she had done so in
writing amounting in effect to a deed or release. We must leave
out of this discussion any reference to dower consummate or
vested. The widow is then free; she may be estopped as others
are. Take the case of Fleming v. Pople5 There the widow enter-
ed into an agreement with her husband in which she took lands in
lieu of her contingent right in a divorce suit, which agreement
was set aside in another suit by creditors of her husband. She
had sold the property. The court held she had sold whatever in-
terest she had and could not set up dower in other lands. She was
estopped "by her solemn deed," says Judge Williams, "from
asserting claim."
If she join with her husband in a trust deed, set aside as a prefer-
ence, she is not estopped from claiming dower in surplus over
amount named in trust deed, even though it may be for benefit of
all the creditors. See. 2, chap. 74, Code, does not enlarge the
scope of such trust deed, beyond its expressed purpose, to the
detriment of the wife's right to dower.5 1  Carver v. Ward, supra,
follows the same line of reasoning, that is: in a court action where
the right to dower is not in issue, whatever is agreed to be done
for the release of this right must be done before she is estopped.
It is so in Virginia. 2 'Where the wife joined with the commission-
er after the sale in the deed for the land sold, in a creditors' suit,
none of the liens established in which, were superior to dower
right, and the husband did not join, the court said there was no
estoppel for the purchaser was not misled.
As a general rule acts of the wife during coverture to operate
as a bar of dower by way of estoppel must in effect amount to
one of the modes pointed out by the common law or recognized by
the statute as constituting a bar.5 3 There are exceptions to this
rule, but we do not find them in the Virginias.
The Ragland Coal Co. Case, under consideration, seems to settle
the question. There the husband and wife were joint tenants and
originally owned the land. The husband conveys his undivided in-
terest without the wife joining. The purchaser sues in partition.
The plaintiff claimed that the defendant, the owner of the undivid-
ed half, was the owner of the contingent right to dower in the
plaintiff's half. The plaintiff sought to have this contingent right
set up in the decree as one of the interests in the land. Although
o 78 W. Va. 176, 88 S. E. 1058.
61 Reynolds v. Whitescarver, et al., 66 W. Va. 388, 66 S. E. 518.
- Lewis v. Apperson, 103 Va. 624, 49 S. E. 978, 68 L. R. A. 867.
53 19 C. J. 500.
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the wife was a party defendant, the court held she was there only
aq a coparcenor or tenant in common, and that the purchaser took
subject to the right of the wife, if the contingent right became
consummate, to assertion of that right. It is true this isn't a case
where the wife remained silent, but the court holds that she does
not have to speak, or act, for neither would affect her right when
consummate. And in this case, would the Virginia amendment of
1886 avail, as the husband's undivided interest was conveyed, with-
out her joinder prior to suit?
What then is the remedy? We observed that from the earliest
times, dower has been favored in the law, a particular writ was
made for its assignment, its assignment was made with dispatch,
its continuance as a legal principle has rested as a moral obliga-
tion binding the consciences of lawgivers and interpreters. The
wife should stand on no higher ground than the husband, but she
should be protected. Unless there is an agreement, or express re-
lease, the contingent right should be held intact for both, and that
right transferred to the fund in case of sale. The purchaser should
not be made to suffer nor to see to an application of the purchase
money. We have an expression in this community that a court
title is the best kind of title to get. Would that it were so. The
purchaser at a judicial sale, under the present statutes, ought to
know the meaning of caveat emptor.
In attachment suits, creditors' suits, and to enforce judgments
or mechanic's liens, partition suits, in fact in all cases when the
judicial sale is ordered, the spectre of the contingent right of
dower, haunts the judgment of the court and the dreams of the
lawyers. Few know when they are safe. It should not be so.
The wife deserves protection. She required it in the time of the
Emperor Justinian, she needs it no less now. But it should not be
at the expense of the purchaser. The purchaser at a judicial sale
should know that he has a clear and unimpeachable title, like Caes-
er's wife-above suspicion, free from any incumbrance of any
character. As it is now litigation or loss frequently awaits him
and development and improvement many times are halted. The
law should be settled. The legislature should act and do so effect-
ively. Dower should be retained from the proceeds of sale and
paid when and if consummate, unless the wife waives it during cov-
erture, and that waiver should be effectual. Good business demands
such action. Common honesty and good morals peremptorily
urge it.
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